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ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
COGITATIONS CONCERNING THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR PARADIGM:
IS THE CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
BY JOSEPH W. BELLACOSA1
My tribute to the Honorable Hugh R. Jones starts with a
borrowed first word. The title of my exertion begins with
"Cogitations." It is the same word Judge Jones so carefully chose
as the first word in the title of his masterful Cardozo Lecture in
1979 - "Cogitations on Appellate Decision-Making." 2 However,
after my imitative highest form of compliment, everything else
that follows is my much more modest contribution to our
jurisprudence on the subject of special and independent
prosecutors. 3
At the outset, please let me say that I am deeply grateful
especially to Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, and also to all my
former and the present Colleagues on the New York State Court
of Appeals, for the privilege of serving with them here, and for
allowing me to appear in this sacred space - our secular sanctum
sanctorum - this most beautiful Courtroom of the Court of
Appeals to deliver this Lecture in Judge Jones' esteemed name
and cherished memory. I am thrilled and honored to do so.
By the way, isn't "Cogitations" a splendid word - not
surprisingly, from a fastidious wordsmith and mind like Judge
Jones'? It is derived from the Latin, cogitare, to think, to ponder
- or as a favorite Synonym Finder 4 of mine suggests, to meditate
and even to brood over. These seem apt images for what I am
1 Joseph W. Bellacosa, Former Judge, Court of Appeals, State of New York; Former
Dean, St. John's University School of Law.
2 Honorable Hugh R. Jones, Cogitations on Appellate Decision-Making, Address
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York at the 35th Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture (Nov. 28, 1979), published by The Historical Society of the Courts of the State of
New York at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/elecbookljones-cardozo/pgl.htm.
3 For my thesis, I use the terms special prosecutor, independent counsel and the like
interchangeably, although I recognize that there can be some important structural and
operational differences.
4 J. I. RODALE, THE SYNONYM FINDER 183 (Rodale Press 1978).
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about to do right before your very eyes - and ears, too. Judge
Jones' exquisite word, therefore, starts me on this somewhat
brooding, but I hope constructive, journey concerning this theme.
I trust you will find it of some interest.
I also thank the Fund for Modern Courts, the principal sponsor
for the last five years, for extending the privilege of this
invitation to me. I thank Albany Law School as the co-sponsor,
and the Institution affording CLE credit. They instructed me, by
the way, to speak long enough (50 minutes) to qualify for the
credit. The Lecture version was an abridged version, therefore,
of what I have prepared for the article to be published, with its
necessary and attendant footnotes.
And I particularly thank Kimberly Troisi-Paton who picked up
where she left off as my law clerk in 1998-2000 to assist me in a
myriad of excellent ways throughout this project, as my research
assistant extraordinaire. This renewed collaboration came about,
in part, thanks to a generous grant I sought from my former
judicial colleague, retired Supreme Court Justice Joan Marie
Durante, whom I acknowledge on behalf of Kim and myself for
being so immediately supportive and instinctively collegial.
Now, since this is not an Oscars' event, I must end the litany of
thank yous - though my family and dear parents, of beloved
memory, do spring to mind and heart in deep gratitude. I will
instead now turn to Judge Jones and the subject at hand, my
lecture theme: The purpose and dangers of Special Prosecutors
in our criminal justice and jurisprudential universe. As may be
surmised from the rhetorical query I pose as my subtitle, it is my
personal opinion that, generally and usually, the cure is
definitely worse than the disease.
Readers may recall or imagine Judge Jones' portrait up on the
side wall of the Courtroom he graced for 12 years; it is worthy of
a moment of silent tribute. You will see an accurate
representation of this fine man and outstanding jurist. His
portrait reflects many of his fine qualities: intelligence,
intellectual discipline and ramrod rectitude in his erect posture
and in his refined habits of mind and conduct. Those of us
privileged to work alongside Judge Jones in various capacities
over many years came to know how he loved charts and color
coded pens and pencils, denoting the stages of his and the Court's
deliberative regimen and decision-making steps. These personal
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protocols reflected a disciplined analytical progression,
thoroughness to a fault - that his colleague and "Chief' for the
1970s era, described as the work of a micro-logician. Chief Judge
Breitel meant it as a compliment, and Judge Jones loved to laugh
hardest of all at the characterization. His wonderful sense of
humor was always inner-directed, but that was no surprise
because Judge Jones was a very kind and thoughtful man.
Former Chief Judge Wachtler, his Colleague for over a decade
and dear friend, describes him as the "Perfect Judge," the finest
jurist among the many with whom he had the privilege of service
and true friendship at the Court of Appeals.
Judge Jones was a Judge of the Court of Appeals for just over
one year when I first met him in 1974 as part of the interview
process with each of the seven Judges that led to my
appointment as Clerk and Counsel to the Court. It was mutual
respect at first sight. Mine for him was truly instantaneous, and
I am not being presumptuous about earning his respect for me.
He later told me so. One might say that our first meeting was
the "start of a beautiful friendship," with kudos for that
memorable phrase to Bogart, as Rick, in Casablanca.
The unparalleled devotion of Judge Jones to the Institution of
the Court of Appeals is memorably inspiring. I recall that it
gently nudged everyone, Judges and Staff alike, also to aspire to
excellence and the collegial common good that he so earnestly
heralded. He knew our Court's capacity to deliver really good
works for people and society. His powers of concentration
towards what he saw as the sacred trust of the work of the Court
are legendary. He spared no time and showed no patience for the
collateral cacophony and distractions that sometimes surrounded
or intruded on the Sessions of Court. Instead, he enthusiastically
loved and methodically enjoyed the pure rhythmic three-step
dance of (1) Chambers work, (2) Conference work and (3)
Courtroom work - each day of every Session. It was an exclusive
concentration, and if you doubt my recollection and testimony, go
read his Cardozo Cogitations Lecture. 5
Yet, let me emphasize that this was no automaton, operating
with some assembly-line methodology. The charm of the man at
work included his humanity, grace, and good humor - all laced
5 See Jones, supra note 2.
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with an unerring sense of dispassionate perspective and genuine
concern for all the people around him - the lawyers, the litigants,
the staff, and the general citizenry. His patrician bearing and
demeanor exuded a professional classiness. That camouflaged
the delightfully impish human being within. In a capsule, I could
say he had character, and was a character.
Some true anecdotal illustrations help me to make the point. 6
He could shrug off, for example, having someone steal his shoes
from the Albany Hotel around the corner, while Court was in
session, as "just one of those things." He could announce he was
going off to a sound sleep on his own election night before the
returns were in on his sharply contested election to the Court of
Appeals in 1972,7 because as he said to his running mate, friend,
and soon-to-be Colleague, Judge Wachtler, there's just nothing
else we can do now anyway. He could drive from Utica to
Manhasset, through a horrendous snowstorm, to spend a day
with that dear former Colleague at a time of that friend's most
dire need of companionship, and think nothing of it - because
Judge Jones valued true friendship and acted on it selflessly and
with compassionate aplomb.
In addition to the adjudicative side of Judge Jones'
contributions to New York State's jurisprudential universe, let
me also provide a glimpse of this excellent jurist from the
administrative side. Through that angle of the prism, what
appears is a consistent person - no surprise there, I guess, for a
micro-logician!
As few intimates know from privileged personal experience at
the marvelous Court of Appeals, its executive work, as
distinguished from its primary adjudicative role, is administered
through discrete Committees of the Judges, appointed by the
Chief Judge, and pulled together under collegial leadership skills
of the Center Chair Presider at plenary Conference Sessions of
the Court in its other sanctum sanctorum - the Conference Room
6 The following anecdotes, and more, are documented in the "Remarks of Matthew J.
Jasen, Senior Associate Judge, New York Court of Appeals at Ceremony Marking
Retirement of Associate Judge Hugh R. Jones" 63 N.Y.2d xiii-xviii (Dec. 19, 1984) and
"Remarks In Memoriam Read in Open Court by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye in Reference
to the Death of Honorable Hugh R. Jones" 95 N.Y.2d xxi-xxiii (entered Mar. 20, 2001).
7 In 1977 the Constitution of the State of New York was amended to change the
selection method for Court of Appeals Judges to a merit-based appointive system. (N.Y.
CONST. art. VI).
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upstairs on the second floor of the Courthouse. I can still see
Judge Jones pushing his own Conference cart (as all the Judges
do) to and from the Conference Room; the cart is loaded with
case-files and the front end of Judge Jones' (his alone) has an
attached holster, armed with his stapler!
In part because he came to the Court in 1973, after the 1972
election, as a practicing lawyer and former State Bar President
with no prior judicial experience, Judge Jones was appointed and
remained for his entire term of judicial office the Chair and Sole
Member of the Court's Bar Relations Committee, with
jurisdiction for all such matters and relationships, including the
Bar Associations and Admission to the Bar. The unfolding of two
major administrative issues demonstrate his skill and
undeviating dedication to the Institution First. To him,
subordination of persona, which is countercultural in our day and
age where glorification of personality seems to be paramount,
was critical to the well being and proper operation of the Court
because the greater common good of the Institution would
thereby be better served.
For years in the 1970s and early 1980s the organized Bar
pressed the Court to inaugurate, by rule-making, a "Lawyers'
Fund for Client Protection," with a biennial lawyers' registration
fee. The Court, under Judge Jones' Committee tutelage,
demurred on the ground that this substantive step must come
about by legislation - a demonstration of his respectful core value
for the distribution of governmental powers.
In the early 1980s the Legislature was finally persuaded to act,
but the negotiations of details became quite entangled.
Suddenly, as so often happens in the legislative process, its
Session was about to end, when, as Clerk, I received a late night
call from the chief legislative counsels of the two Houses - Ken
Shapiro and Jack Haggerty. A single direct question, allowing no
time for reflection or consultation, was put to me: In the bill
about to be passed at that moment, along with hundreds of other
last minute items, should they put "Chief Judge" or "Court of
Appeals" in as the appointing entity for the 7 members of the
Board of Trustees of this new Client Security Fund? Though I
knew that the then-Chief Judge wanted "Chief Judge," in the bill,
my long collaboration and discussions with Judge Jones in his
Committee role on this matter prompted me to answer: "Court of
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Appeals." And, as they say in Scriptures, and in legislative
sausage making, - "So, it came to pass." Well, when the dust
settled and that bill, with the "Court of Appeals" as the
appointing authority, emerged as the law, 8 the then-Chief Judge
was disappointed - especially with me when he found out how
the law came to pass. Judges Jones, as always a stand-up guy,
took all the heat and told the Chief and the Court that that was
his direction to me. Besides, he added, it was the right
Institutional choice because the new Board should be answerable
and accountable to the full Court, not just the person who
happened to be Chief at any given time. One of the delightful
twists of history is that a charter member of that new body in
1981 was none other than the present Chief Judge, (Hon. Judith
S. Kaye) appointed then by the Court, on the nomination of her
predecessor Chief Judge Lawrence Cooke, both of Monticello!
Judge Jones was also the astute sole Court Committee member
on another key development directly affecting this Court's
docket. He engineered the selection of ABA President Robert
MacCrate, Columbia Professor Maury Rosenberg and Appellate
Division Justice James D. Hopkins as the three member
Committee, under the auspices of the American Judicature
Society, to work with me as Clerk and produce the independent
documentary report, "Appellate Justice in New York,"9 without
which I could not have later successfully negotiated Chapter 300
of the Laws of 198510 when I was by then Chief Administrative
Judge of the State.
As all insiders and astute analysts know, that law profoundly
reduced this Court's docket from over 700 argued appeals per
year to fewer than 200 on a wise certiorari re-allocation of
judicial resources and power." It gave virtually total control to
the Court of Appeals of its own civil case docket. The linchpin
and selling point in the negotiation of this reform were quality
over volume, and Judge Jones saw how the external Committee
8 See N.Y. JUD LAW § 468-b (Consol. 1988); see also N.Y. STATE FIIt. LAW § 97-t
(Consol. 1990).
9 ROBERT MACCRATE, MAURICE ROSENBERG & JAMES D. HOPKINS, APPELLATE
JUSTICE IN NEW YORK (American Judicature Society 1982).
10 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602 (Consol. 1986) (amending sub (a), opening paragraph of N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5602 (1985)).
11 See Annual Report of Clerk of the Court passim 1984-2005, State of New York
Court of Appeals, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/.
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Report would lend independent credibility and help to get this
legislation passed, over heavy opposition from the Bench and Bar
and among the Legislature itself. He wisely secured this
objective documentation outside the Court, to validate the merits
of the case for the goal the Court deemed desirable. It took years
but, in the end, was successful, thanks to a very savvy fellow -
the Honorable Hugh R. Jones. He demonstrated his
administrative acumen to forge an adjudicative benefit - always
with his eye on the ball of Institution First.
Frankly, the many sweet and instructive anecdotes, and also
the list of serious stories about significant cases that I could
personally recount involving Judge Jones' unique contributions
and personality would earn some extra CLE credits! Indeed, our
honoree and my dear friend's spirit - ever present in this
Courtroom - is no doubt becoming impatient with me. I can feel
his cogitating, brooding presence in the air, as though he were
channeling me. He wants me to get on, already, with the serious
business of the lecture theme. I suppose if Judge Jones were to
speak the language of my heritage, he would crisply utter the
words "Basta!" and "Avanti!" - or some Welsh variation of same.
Unmistakably, it would be: "Enough, and Get on With It, Joe." I
will obey because I sense my dear wife, Mary, is thinking the
same thing. And then there always lurks the deterrent of last
resort - the Chief Judge's red lectern light!
The topic I have chosen seems ripe because more than three
decades of time for reflection have passed since the 1970's era of
the State-appointed New York City Special Prosecutor who was
charged with investigating corruption in the criminal justice
system. There has been opportunity for some dispassionate
reflection and detailed assessment - qualities Judge Jones liked.
Discussion of this topic requires a contextual appreciation of
one of Judge Jones' favorite principles and overarching themes -
the distribution and allocation of governmental powers and
responsibilities - checks and balances - accountability. Call it
what you will. Some call it separation of powers; the latter,
however, is a phrase not favored by Judge Jones. He preferred
the positive semantical nomenclature: the embracive power of
collegiality and complimentarity - the working together of
differently gifted and experienced individuals among distributed
duties and powers in a respected, tested Institution, designed to
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render a common good, larger than the mere sum of separate,
individual parts.
I initially set the table of the presentation of my views with
some helpful allies. I invoke: (1) a couple of paragraphs from
United States Attorney General, Supreme Court Justice, and
Special Prosecutor at Nuremberg, the Honorable Robert Jackson;
(2) some pithy extracts from a dissenting opinion of Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia; and, (3) most importantly, some
comments and thinking from Judge Jones himself. I really liked
working with the materials of these three outstanding jurists, all
New Yorkers - Jamestown, Queens and Utica, respectively! The
only thing better would be someone from Brooklyn because that's
where I hail from.
In proper order, then, first, I turn to Judge Jones. In his 1979
"Cogitations" Cardozo Lecture, he remarked on his own "very
healthy respect ... for the distribution of powers in our
governmental polity."12 This was not simply a turn of phrase - a
function of terminology - that sounded lovely for his lecture, or
even to be used as a quickie sound-bite quote. Rather, the genius
of that succinct guiding star finds resonance and application in
his judicial opinions for the Court. For example, in Levittown v.
Nyquist,13 in 1982, the Court examined the constitutionality of
the state school finance system, to be sure - in a context
different, however, from the school financing controversy, decided
shortly after this Lecture.14
Judge Jones wrote in Levittown: "With full recognition and
respect... for the distribution of powers... among the
legislative, executive and judicial branches, it is the responsibility
of the courts to adjudicate contentions that actions taken by the
Legislature and the executive fail to conform to the mandates of
the Constitutions which constrain the activities of all three
branches. That because of limited capabilities and competencies
the courts might encounter great difficulty in fashioning and
then enforcing particularized remedies appropriate to repair
unconstitutional action on the part of the Legislature or the
executive is neither to be ignored on the one hand nor on the
12 See Jones, supra note 2, at 10.
13 57 N.Y.2d 27 (1982).
14 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (2006).
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other to dictate judicial abstention in every case."15 That is a
brilliant, cohesive, and comprehensive articulation - succinct and
helpful, too, for all it portends.16
There, Judge Jones explicitly encapsulated the respectful
limitations and expansive potentialities of checks and balances,
and the deliberate distribution of power. Indeed, I have not
discovered a demarcated separation of powers established by the
federal and state laws of our land. Instead, one often finds
interdependence and interplay, rather than metes and bounds
segmentation. That is the foundation stone and genius of our
system, in my view.
So, what happens when one branch within the cogwheels of the
distribution goes awry? Today, I propose that when that
happens, when special prosecutors, for example, are appointed
and exercise their mandates beyond the structure of the
distribution of power calibrations to the executive branch, of
which they are a part, then an inherent flaw in the harmonious
system is exposed. Special prosecutors are too often given a kind
of pass and seeming immunity from well-tested restraints on
regular officers, and are perceived and empowered to be free
agents pursuing their own notions of good and even allowed and
expected to pursue a preconceived objective or a targeted person.
The seeds of trouble are embedded in that Dodge City Marshal
calculus because it is antithetical to the neutral pursuit of fair
and objective justice. Maurice Sendak, the ingenious illustrator,
might conjure up a peculiar allegorical and metaphorical
creature, like a cross-breed between a "Sacred Cow" with a
"Rogue Elephant," to produce, from that Dr. Strangelove
Laboratory: "Voild: A Special Prosecutor!"
Justice Scalia recognized much of this in 1988. He famously
and forebodingly, dissented alone in Morrison v. Olson,17 a case
in which the Supreme Court upheld the footloose power of a
federal independent counsel. Justice Scalia wrote, "That is what
this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among
Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to
15 Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 39 (emphasis added).
16 Future commentators will have to ponder and dissect how Levittown played out in
Campaign for Fiscal Equity IW.
17 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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preserve the equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish."' 8
Justice Scalia "feared"19 that the institution of a special
prosecutor or independent counsel would destabilize this
balanced allocation of powers. 20 To buttress his concerns, Justice
Scalia summoned words of Justice Robert Jackson, my third key
source in this threshold section of the lecture.
Then-Attorney General Jackson in 1940 admonished the
United States Attorneys of this great Nation as follows
concerning their "dangerous" prosecutorial powers:
There is a most important reason why the prosecutor
should have, as nearly as possible, a detached and impartial
view of all groups in his community. One of the greatest
difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick
18 Id. at 699.
19 Id. at 733 ("I fear the Court has permanently encumbered the Republic with an
institution that will do it great harm.").
20 It is particularly appropriate in my Fifth Hugh R. Jones Memorial Lecture to
highlight this jurisprudential contribution from Justice Scalia's extraordinary record.
This superior jurist needs no defense from me, as he takes excellent personal care of his
own record by his own opinions and extra judicial/academic presentations. However, in
the immediately preceding Fourth Hugh R. Jones Memorial Lecture on September 12,
2005, retired Court of Appeals Judge Richard D. Simons used the occasion to sharply
criticize Justice Scalia on an ethical issue. See, Honorable Richard D. Simons, Address at
the 2005 Hugh R. Jones Memorial Lecture at Albany Law School (Sept. 12, 2005)
(referencing the Memorandum of Justice Scalia on Sierra Club's Motion for Recusal in
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004)).
Judge Simons' criticism subsequently became the highlighted lead in the New York Law
Journal, page 1 story the very next day. See John Caher, Former Judge Speaks at Albany
Law School, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 13, 2005, at 1. It is my purpose in this extended footnote, in
part, to provide a counterpoint and a more appropriate perspective on and illustration of
Justice Scalia's jurisprudential excellence and judicial role and additionally. See also
Scott Turow, Scalia the Civil Libertarian?, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Nov. 26, 2006, at 22.
Curiously and additionally, in another section of Judge Simons' 2005 Jones Lecture, stare
decisis and respect for a Court's overall oeuvre are also somewhat obliquely discussed,
subjects on which Judge Simons and I have also differed significantly in the past. See
People v. Damiano, 87 N.Y.2d 277, 488 (N.Y. 1996), (Simons, J. ,concurring); id. at 490
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). In that case, with a solo cramped interpretation of stare decisis,
he would have interdicted my conscientious judicial duty and function to vote and express
my views on a point of law, as I saw it. See Damiano, 87 N.Y.2d at 490, 491 n.1, 504-506
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See also Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201 (N.Y. 1989),
where as Acting Chief Judge, Judge Simons attempted to starchily stifle my separate
concurring/plurality opinion with his dissent. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 214, 216. See also
Merced v. City of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 798 (N.Y. 1990) (Bellacosa, J. vote on constraint
without opinion, referring back to Kircher v. Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251 (N.Y. 1989)).
Ironically, and of note with respect to my later themes in this Lecture concerning the
relationship between legal players and the media, Judge Simons' criticism of other jurists
harbors little self-awareness of his own departure from collegial propriety. See Hon.
Richard D. Simons, Oral History, in 1 N.Y. LEGAL HIST. 53 in which confidences of the
innermost deliberations and conversations of the Court of Appeals and its Judges on
many controversial cases and matters are divulged to the approbation of the media. See
also John Caher, Ex-Judge's Straight-Shooter Image is Reinforced by his Oral Record,
N.Y. L. J., Feb. 2, 2006, at 1.
2007]
STJOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
his cases, because no prosecutor can ever inveitigate all of
the cases in which he receives complaints. What every
prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases
for prosecution and to select those in which the offense is the
most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof
the most certain.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he
thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be
prosecuted. [It] is not a question of discovering the
commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has
committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then
searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to
pin some offense on him. It is in this realm - in which the
prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to
embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and
then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of
prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement
becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being
unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being
attached to the wrong political views, or being personally
obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.2 1
Indeed, Justice Scalia's premonitions and Justice Jackson's
admonitions have rung true - both with respect to the federal
Independent Counsel miscarriages that would occupy the
attention of the Nation toward the end of the twentieth century,
and now into the twenty-first, as well as under the Special
Prosecutor regime in New York State, which ran through the
1970s, and on which Judge Jones and the Court of Appeals had
much impact and many important things to say during that
period.
Let me emphasize right here, I do not intend by my criticisms
of the Paradigm to demonize Maurice Nadjari or Kenneth Starr
or similarly situated special prosecutors or independent counsels,
in some personal or ad hominem manner. Rather, my focus is on
the culture and operations of their, and like, Offices where
officious self-righteousness can take hold under misguided
21 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting R. Jackson, The
Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States
Attorneys, Apr. 1, 1940) (emphasis added).
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leadership. It can infuse such staffs, too, with an excessive zeal,
an inflated sense of importance, and a kind of hubris, driven with
the energy of concentrated power, that blinds them to their own
human fallibilities and to institutional self-restraints, or even
external limitations.
Thus, I tender another key corollary to my overall thesis. I am
referring to the acknowledgment of institutional humility. This
modest virtue recognizes and respects the human element in the
discharge of the powers of all branches and the charisms
provided by other gifted persons - differently experienced
members of any of the various spindels of government. This
elementary rubric acknowledges the nature of temporary
entrustments, and the interrelationship and dependence on other
institutions, wherein each is in league and in collaborative efforts
to perform the public business of the people in limited spheres of
operation. The pact rests on mutual respect. Avoidance of
macho individualism, with ready acceptance of the time-tested,
balancing mechanisms underpinning our system of governance
are what make the system work well - most of the time.
The genius of the common law process can be tapped into to
appreciate the helpful methodology of trial, error, correction, and
interstitial small steps supported by healthy respect for the
principle of stare decisis22 - the wisdom and building blocks of
those who have gone before and what they have had to say. This
recognition is the counterpoint to big gigantic leaps and sweeping
forays and silver-bulleted solutions to problems and crises, dealt
with by some as though on a tabula rasa - as though the world
begins anew with each of them. These misguided folks suffer
from personal hubris and an institutional immaturity. Within
the reality-based and time-tested system that I endorse, humility
connotes strength, not weakness. The common law process and
the distributive system of powers of governance offer much in
common. They march to a similar drumbeat in a procession that
all people can gracefully join and appreciate for their helpful
guidance.
Consider power itself as a component and manifestation of the
human experience, insofar as it bears on my major and minor
22 See supra text accompanying note 20, regarding People v. Damiano; see generally
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LL.D., THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168-184 (1947).
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
themes. Power offers an additional backdrop to the further
particularized assessment of the Special Prosecutor role,
especially in New York's jurisprudence and experience. History
teaches that pure power can be a dangerous intoxicant, and its
unchecked exercise can generate exponentially expanded and
unintended deliriums. The Latin root word is imperium.23
When Special Prosecutors are invested with their enormous
power, the appointing agents enjoy an easy way out of their
personal accountability for navigating and solving crises on their
own watches. They feel "compelled by necessity"24 to so act, and
fail to "stick to the good." Shakespeare places a pointed literary
reference - a ready rationalization - in Bassanio's voice in the
Merchant of Venice, when he urges that there is justification for
little wrongs to reach great rights and ends.25 Lord Acton
summarized this notion with his adage that "Power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely."26 Machiavelli instructed:
"[The Prince] must stick to the good so long as he can, but, being
compelled by necessity, he must be ready to take the way of evil."27
That's his classical utterance of the warning against "ends
justifying means."
For me, nothing in relatively recent New York history
dramatizes the pitfalls of potential and actual abuse of power
more than the special prosecutorial machinations exhibited
during the Nadjari era - perhaps because I was involved in it so
closely in my own professional life and career. I witnessed the
sweep of it first-hand, from distinct overlapping roles as a
lawyer, academician and court official.
The particular Special Prosecutor I speak of was appointed by
Governor Rockefeller because of corruption uncovered, in the
criminal justice system of New York City. The Knapp
Commission investigation, in 1972, recommended the
appointment of a Special Prosecutor. That Office and the Person
23 See generally ROBERT HARRIS, IMPERIUM: A NOVEL OF ANCIENT ROME (2006)
(discussing Cicero and "power," during Roman times).
24 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 63-64 (Daniel Donno trans., Bantam Books
1981).
25 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
26 For an explanation of the quote, which originated in an 1887 letter from Lord
Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887), see
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html (last visited March 14, 2007).
27 See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 24, at 63-64 (emphasis added).
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selected to lead it was authorized by Executive Order to
supersede the five elected District Attorneys of New York City's
five counties. This new, somewhat unique Office was given
exclusive jurisdiction and feared power, on a virtually open-
ended scale, with almost on-demand resources in money and
personnel. 28 The recommendation was implemented with the
appointment of Maurice Nadjari and even a special Judge, John
Murtagh, also appointed by the Governor by Executive Order,
authorized under an unusual provision of the State Constitution,
not by the assignment within Judiciary itself, as is customary
and wise. That sole Judge was to preside over all matters coming
out of the Nadjari envelopment - a problem of even deeper
dimension and concern for the fair and neutral administration of
justice, because they appeared to exist and operate as a sort of
"Team."29
Within a few years, matters had spun badly out of control with
cases that failed to hold up under scrutiny and appellate review,
and with press releases, press conferences, and leaks of Grand
Jury investigations of an inflammatory, tenuous and unfair
nature seeming to flow endlessly. Ironically, an ensuing
Commission on Investigation, in a study of the operations of the
Special Prosecutor's Office itself, would find that the Special
Prosecutor had made false and unauthorized disclosures to the
media and public about investigations of public corruption,
including unfounded public attacks on the Judiciary and the
Judicial Process itself.30 Meanwhile, as the various cases brought
by that Office wound their way through the independent court
system - independent at least at the appellate level - both the
Special Prosecutor's Office and many targets of its investigations
jousted, and jockeyed, with their respective advocacy efforts, to
gain the upper-hand or some advantage of the justice system in
service of their own ends.31 This unseemly tension, not a healthy,
28 See Robert M. Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City-The
Constitutionality and Legality of Executive Order No. 55, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 517, 517-48
(1972-1973).
29 See generally Maurice H. Nadjari, New York State's Office of the Special Prosecutor:
A Creation Born of Necessity, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 97-128 (1974).
30 State of New York Commission on Investigation, The Nadjari Office and the Press
(Nov. 18, 1976).
31 See Lawrence T. Kurlander & Valerie Friedlander, A Symposium on Special
Prosecutions and the Role of the Independent Counsel: Perilous Executive Power-
Perspective on the Special Prosecutors in New York, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 53-54 (1987).
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professional adversarial system, created an atmosphere for a
perfect storm of further irony, considering the initial purpose and
intent of the Knapp Commission's recommendations to clean up
corruption and restore integrity and confidence to. the system.
Irony does not, however, do justice as a characterization of the
corrosive harm done to presumptively innocent people and to the
loss of respect and dignity in the administration of justice - by
the very Office charged, specially to root out the old corruption!32
The incarnation of this Special Prosecutor's Office seemed to me
to implode on itself and spawn a new, and different form of
breakdown of process.
For example, in People v. Mackell,33 the Special Prosecutor
succeeded at a jury trial in convicting a local District Attorney
(Queens County, New York City) of misdemeanors. When the
Special Prosecutor decisively lost the intermediate Appellate
Division appeal, based in part on massive prosecutorial
misconduct at the trial, he then proceeded to secure an appeal to
the Court of Appeals. The jurisdictional limitations at the time
concerning "law and facts" reversals by the Appellate Division
did not allow such an appeal - or at least did not allow review of
the issues with any legal consequence - an important procedural
limitation and technicality. Judge Jones' customarily tempered
approach to the distribution of powers is reflected in the four
Judge majority opinion of the Court. It said: "Needless to say, a
procedural law, adopted after careful legislative consideration of
competing public policy considerations, is not to be disregarded
at will simply because its impact on a particular case precludes
additional appellate review after both parties have already
enjoyed the advantages of a full and lengthy trial and of an
equally exhaustive appeal. [E]ven the State's highest court may
not refuse, as the [solo] dissent [in support of the Special
Prosecutor] would have us do, to apply the plain import of an
applicable statute, which, until and unless amended or repealed,
must be respected as the law for all our people, no matter where
positioned."34 Chief Judge Breitel concurred separately with two
Judges joining his opinion, and Judge Jasen dissented alone. As
32 See id.
33 People v. Mackell, 40 N.Y.2d 59 (1976) (affirming 47 A.D.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div.
1975)).
34 Id. at 63.
[Vol. 21:3
IS THE CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
a footnote of sorts, the jurisdiction-limiting statute that caused so
much consternation was later amended to provide a bit more
review flexibility. 35
I happen to be intimately familiar with the egregious Special
Prosecutor's machinations in that case because I was one of the
successful appellate counsel for our clients at the Appellate
Division. By the time that the final litigation chapter of that
case was written, I was Clerk and Counsel of the Court of
Appeals. To avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest
and role, Chief Judge Breitel instructed me to take a walk in the
park on the day that appeal was argued in the court of last resort
- literally, "leave the building," said he to me. That instruction
included absence from the formal conferencing of the case, too,
right up to the announcement of the decision. I came to love the
park across the street from the Courthouse!
As another laser ray through the prism of this subject and
case, let me also share a disturbing episode, revealed for the first
time publicly. I had agreed to collaborate with two outstanding
lawyers on the appeal to the Appellate Division in the Mackell
case. My esteemed co-counsels were former Chief Judge Charles
Desmond [his portrait is up there on the wall, too, just above
Judge Jones'], and my classmate at St. John's, Robert McGuire
Rlater to be a great New York City Police Commissioner in the
Mayor Koch Administration, and my lifelong dear friend]. As we
were working on the appellate brief back in 1974, one day a
student of mine [as I was then a Professor of Law at St. John's]
asked for an appointment to see me after class in Criminal
Procedure. He proceeded to describe to me his job interview at
the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It concentrated heavily on
questions to him about me - what was I like in the classroom?
did I have strong opinions about prosecutorial tactics like
entrapment? and the like. I was shocked that, apparently
because I had dared to join the appellate defense team against
that Office, my academic viewpoints, and I, then became a
subject of this kind of collateral inquiry. Worst of all, the student
was being misused in this misguided, clumsy effort to scope me
out, or try to intimidate me. This incident angered me, and
motivated me to work even harder to defeat something I then
35 See N.Y. C.P.L. § 450.90(2)(a) (as amended in 1979).
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came to see as dangerous, as well as flat-out wrong on the law.
Fortunately, we went on to win the case, and in the ultimate
"high-fiver", we not only beat the wrong-headed guys on the law
in court, but we also helped to get them fired. The undertones of
McCarthy-era-like tactics, however, with their foreboding clouds
of incursions on right to zealous and independent representation
by counsel of choice, and prosecutorial dirty tricks like processing
phony cases and improper entrapments, (reported activities of
that Office),3 6 have stayed with me as deep concerns and
reminders of how fragile yet carefully calibrated our balanced
criminal justice process is, and how easy it is for a heavy thumb
to tip the scales of justice.
Another case saga of that period is instructive. In Matter of
Dondi,37 the prosecuted party switched his defense strategy back
and forth between civil and criminal forums with differing
procedural consequences. As a result, the indicted attorney,
accused of bribing police officers in order to obtain testimony
favorable to clients in civil cases, ran a crazy-quilt procedural
race to different courtrooms that eventually had to be sorted out
by the Court of Appeals.
The majority opinion by then-Judge Cooke granted a writ of
prohibition against the Special Prosecutor. It was a 4 to 3
decision. At the time, in my role as Clerk and Counsel to the
Court, I privately agreed with the Majority - largely based on my
academic background and Practice Commentaries publications in
the criminal procedure area, and also based on my personal
experience in the Mackell case. Frankly, I so intensely disliked
the odious brand of justice that seemed to be emanating from the
Special Prosecutor's tactics, that I saw a need for him and his
tactics to be stopped - by any procedural device and means
available. That view might warrant some personal
recrimination, as a latter-day reflection of my own knee-jerk
version of ends justifying means. During my review and work for
the Jones' Lecture, however, I came away still convinced that the
Majority was right, with the frank acknowledgment of the
36 See Abuse of Power: A Staff Report of the Codes Committee of the New York State
Assembly (May 1976); Bennett L. Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the
Staged Arrest, (1982), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edullawfaculty/175
(Professor Gershman argued the Mackell appeal on behalf of The Special Prosecutor's
Office).
37 Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976).
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weighty reasons expressed in the Breitel-Jones dissent in that
case that legitimate process was being distorted and
manipulated, in justification, to overcome or neutralize the
Special Prosecutor's first-strike procedural abuses. Mackell and
Dondi, among the blizzard of Nadjari cases38 grinding through
the courts during that era, prove to me once again, as described
by Chief Judge Cardozo in the Nature of the Judicial Process,39
how hard and how close these cases and this justice business can
be.
A notable almost afterthought in Judge Cooke's majority
opinion is worthy of mention: "By this determination we do not
free Dondi. Rather, his prosecution for the crimes charged,
either under the present indictment or any superseding
indictments, should be undertaken by the District Attorney of
Queens County [the successor to the removed D.A. Thomas
Mackell]."40 In other words, the Court underscored the value of
letting the regular, measured, time-tested processes, with all
their known warts, work their way through and around issues.
The implication is that justice will triumph - albeit, eventually.
Indeed, New York jurisprudence reflects the evolution of
another nuance in this area. Seven years after Dondi, Judge
Jones joined the majority opinion for 5 Judges, with two recusals,
in Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman.41 It stated: "[The District
Attorney and Special Prosecutor] argue that prohibition should
not be available to prevent the investigation before it even starts.
The short answer to that contention is that we are not stopping
the District Attorney from pursuing her duties. She or her
38 See, e.g., Rao v. State, 74 A.D.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), leave to appeal denied,
50 N.Y.2d 803 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 449 US 982 (1980); People v. Weiner, 63 A.D.2d
722 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); People v. DiFalco, 54 A.D.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), affd,
44 N.Y.2d 482 (N.Y. 1978); Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 A.D.2d 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976);
Democratic County Committee v. Nadjari, 52 A.D.2d 70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Morritt v.
Nadjari, 511 A.D.2d 754 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), stay denied, 39 N.Y.2d 744 (N.Y. 1976);
Alessi v. Nadjari, 47 A.D.2d 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Steinman v. Nadjari, 49 A.D.2d
456 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Rao v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Klein v.
Murtagh, 44 A.D.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 988 (N.Y. 1974); Nigrone
v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), affld, 36 N.Y.2d 421 (N.Y. 1975); People
v. Rao, 45 A.D.2d 958 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), affd by, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421
(N.Y. 1975); People v. Steinman, 44 A.D.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); People v. Vitale,
No. K340266 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973).
39 See generally, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, THE
STORRS LECTURES DELIVERED AT YALE UNIVERSITY (Hall ed., Yale University Press 1947)
(1921).
40 Matter of Dondi, supra note 37, at 12.
41 60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983).
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subordinates may exercise all the powers of her office to
investigate and, if the evidence warrants it, to prosecute
petitioner [then-Assemblyman and now United States Senator
Charles Schumer] or those involved with him.... [Prohibition
will] lie to void an ultra vires appointment by the District
Attorney... The embarrassment of respondent Holtzman or the
fact that she may be accused of a vendetta because of prior
political differences [with Schumer] are considerations which she
must weigh in either proceeding with the matter herself or
moving for the judicial appointment of a special prosecutor." 42 In
other words, the judicial direction is to fulfill the elected
responsibility and be accountable for it. That is a very good and
simple rule, as I see it, and stopping a Special Prosecutor from
even starting up sure helped then-Assemblyman Schumer's
career by keeping his record and reputation clean. The zealous
and intelligent advocacy of his outstanding lawyer, my friend and
former colleague in other pursuits, the late Arthur Liman, surely
also helped.
The consequences of the Nadjari blizzard of publicity-seeking
broadsides and questionable or marginal cases (and I have barely
scratched the surface with my selected illustrations) demonstrate
the preferred imperative: trust should be invested in the
regularized, tested processes, entities and institutions to
maintain and develop respect for and confidence in them, not
disrespect and cynicism by diversion and superseder. By the
time Nadjari was "fired" by Governor Carey after the Mackell
case debacle, with the eventual and needed acquiescence of the
New York State's Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz (a different
check-and-balance mechanism), the Special Prosecutor's office
had done a lot of damage to individuals, and to the torn tapestry
of ordered process. 43 Despite a scant record of successful
prosecutions, the annual budget of that exceedingly privileged
Office averaged about $2 million.44
42 Id. at 54-56.
43 An Abrupt Exit for the Superprosecutor, TIME MAG. ARTICLE ARCHIVE, Jan. 5, 1976,
available at http:ltime-proxy.yaga.com/timelarchivelprintoutl0,23657,947607,00.html.
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007). It indicted 296 people on various accusations of corruption.
Some guilty verdicts were obtained against low-level government officials; one guilty
verdict against a local District Attorney (Thomas Mackell) was eventually overturned and
all charges dismissed; at least 500 investigations were underway. See also Kurlander,
supra note 31, at 11, 53-54.
44 See Kurlander, supra note 31, at 53-54.
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The wreckage left behind in the wake of this prosecutorial
hurricane was enormous: lives and reputations were wrongly
ruined; regularized and legitimate criminal processes, including
innocent judicial officers and the judicial system itself, were
scarred with cynical suspicion; and some corruption intended to
be rooted out, instead, festered, with a nefarious new Special
Prosecutorial form of official mischief fostered. That is one lousy
legacy!
Ironically, after Governor Carey ousted Nadjari, the Special
Prosecutor audaciously and publicly leaked that some of
Governor Carey's appointments were also being investigated.
Nadjari even asserted that he fell out of political favor because he
was getting too close to the hard core of corruption - high level
Democratic judges and public officials.45 He even tried to
subpoena the Governor before a Grand Jury, as a press and
media stunt to hold onto his waning power. His desperation
tactics thankfully failed. In an effort to clear the air, Governor
Carey ironically appointed a successor Special Prosecutor, of all
things, to investigate the allegations made by Nadjari. No
substantiation was found.46 The Assembly also investigated the
Nadjari Office and documented its abuses.4 7 Later, Governor
Cuomo tried to reform the whole process with a comprehensive
review and a regularized regime, with direct-line
accountability. 48 Unfortunately, it never fully materialized with
any legislative imprimatur.
The graphic history lesson of the 1970's with the New York
laboratory of its Special Prosecutor experience, sadly, did not
prevent other mistakes from recurring with some of the
experiences of Federal Independent Counsels of the 1980s, and
1990s. Society's inability to learn from past mistakes condemned
it to suffer similar mistakes anew, as George Santayana
warned. 49 Karl Marx put it more trenchantly: "History repeats
45 An Abrupt Exit for the Superprosecutor, TIME MAG. ARTICLE ARCHIVE, Jan. 5, 1976,
available at http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/printoutO,23657,947607,00.html.
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
46 Transcript of News Conference of Governor Hugh L. Carey (Dec. 30, 1975).
47 See Abuse of Power: A Staff Report of the Codes Committee of the New York State
Assembly (May 1976).
48 See Kurlander, supra note 31, at 62.
49 GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE, LIFE OF REASON VOLUME I 284
(Scribner's 1905) ('Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.").
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itself first as tragedy, and then as farce!"50
History also is studded with other bad Special Prosecutor
analogies - e.g., the French Reign of Terror and Revolution; the
British Star Chamber; the Spanish Inquisition; Senator Joseph
McCarthy's House UnAmerican Activities Committee. On the
other hand, I note that some really good and necessary Special
Prosecutor prototypes of integrity and effectiveness have
occasionally emerged: - e.g. the N.Y.S. Office of Special
Prosecutor for Nursing Homes, my friend and jurisprudential
trailblazer in that field, Charles "Joe" Hynes, now five times
elected District Attorney of Brooklyn; Gov. Dewey and his
groundbreaking prosecution of racketeers like Lucky Luciano in
New York County with the help of two young assistant
prosecutors who went on to become Chief Judges of the Court of
Appeals, Stanley H. Fuld and Charles D. Breitel; the Judge
Seabury Commission chasing the disappearing Judge Joseph
Crater and the ocean-cruising Mayor Jimmy Walker in
corruption of the 1930s; remember, too, Archibald Cox with
President Nixon and then Watergate, in contrast to Whitewater's
turbulence between Kenneth Starr and President Clinton.
A lesson I would draw from these few comparisons is that the
Special Prosecutor Paradigm ought to be the rarity, reserved for
truly exceptional situations, when a crisis renders ordinary
process and officers powerless to act - totally unavailable and
inoperable, in fact or in effect - functus officio. The designated
responsibility should be narrowly and exclusively circumscribed.
Then let regular process otherwise run its course, even if bumpy
at times. Appointing entities should, first and persistently,
search and strain to find any alternative, other than a Special
Prosecutor; and even when an alternative is found, go back and
try yet another truly Jonesian touch of genius as the fallback, a
deus ex machina that nevertheless keeps the crisis in house and
in regular channels. This device is found in Morgenthau vs.
Cooke,51 with its famous FN 3 in the Per Curiam Opinion,
applying the exceptional "Rule of Necessity" that allowed the
Court to rule on its own Judicial Branch powers. 52
50 KARL MARX, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, in ON THE REVOLUTION
245 (vol. 1 of The Karl Marx Library) (Saul K. Padover ed. and trans.) (1971).
51 56 N.Y.2d 24 (1982).
52 Id. at 29, n.3. "At the outset we dispose of any speculation that, because one of the
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Speaking of which, I cannot resist sharing one of my favorite
recollections from my Clerk years at the Court of Appeals. It
revolves around the previously noted case in which the
Manhattan District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau sued the Chief
Judge, Lawrence Cooke. This Court did not punt, vouch in or
otherwise avoid its duty in that extraordinary case, as explained
in the famous footnote. That Rule of Necessity allowed the Court
to rule on some of its own administrative - consultative -
approval powers under the State Constitution, 53 as a check-and-
balance restraint against unilateral Chief Judge rule and policy-
making powers for the management of the Unified Court System.
Remarkably, the six remaining Associate Judges ruled to uphold
their own administrative role, function and powers. They
decided that their leader-Colleague, the then-Chief Judge, had
exceeded his authority because he did not consult and gain their
approval on a trial judge-assignment policy and rule that he had
unilaterally promulgated. 54 In one of my personally more
memorable functions as Clerk of the Court, I had the unique
"privilege" (gulp) of leaving the Conference Room (the other
sanctum sanctorum on the 2nd Floor) to inform the Chief Judge in
his Chambers across the hall that the Court, his Colleagues, had
just unanimously ruled against him on the ground that he, yes,
constitutional deficiencies urged by petitioners was the failure to obtain approval of any
pertinent standard or administrative policy by the Court of Appeals, the members of this
court should decline to participate in the appeal. Even if we were to assume that a
disqualifying ex officio interest exists which might be a basis for recusal we would
nevertheless be required to proceed in the matter under the "Rule of Necessity." But see
Matter of Ryers, 72 N.Y. 1 (1878). As stated by Sir Frederick Pollock, that rule mandates
that "although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a
case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case
cannot be heard otherwise." FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 270
(6th ed, 1929). Cf. United States v Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). With respect to the litigation
before us, this court has exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution of this State to hear
the appeal from the order of the Appellate Division (art VI, § 3(b)(1)); no other judicial
body exists to which this appeal could be referred for disposition. Nor would the situation
be different if the members of this court were to recuse themselves and summon other
jurists to serve in their place for the purpose of deciding this appeal. Substitute Judges
who might be designated to this Bench would themselves, for the period of their service,
assume the institutional character of this court and would therefore be subject to the
same suggestion of disability that might be thought to exist as to the court as presently
composed. Indeed, the present circumstance is not conceptually different from the
situation in which the court is called on to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction, a
determination which it makes with some frequency. Finally, to the extent that there
might be apprehended some personal discomfiture to the members of this court in ruling
on an appeal in which the Chief Judge is a litigant, such discomfort provides no
justification for our declining to execute the duties of our judicial offices.
53 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 26(i), 28(c).
54 See Morgenthau, supra note 51, at 32-33.
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he the Chief Judge, had acted unconstitutionally. Try to imagine
that notification one-on-one.
The case itself is historically and precedentially important with
respect to Judicial Branch check-and-balance governance, of
course, but it is the Rule of Necessity aspect, found in of all
places - a footnote - that allowed the permanent Court to rule on
its own powers, rather than invoking some substitute entity,
transfer, or vouched-in Justices. And it was Judge Jones who
engineered the idea, and fabulous footnote, as a solution for how
the permanent Court could retain the case and rule on that issue,
despite the manifest conflict.
In another of Judge Jones' extraordinary exhibitions of
subordination of Ego to the sublimation of Institution, I draw
attention to the case of People v. Warner Lambert,55 in 1980, also
when I was Clerk of the Court. Two Judges were recused, and
the remaining five split 3-2 in favor of sustaining an indictment
against corporate defendants in a criminal prosecution for
criminally negligent manslaughter arising out of a factory
explosion in Queens. The State Constitution requires a
minimum quorum of 5 Judges to hear a case, and a separate,
lesser known, additional requirement that at least 4 Judges
coalesce to rule one way or the other. 56 No one of the five Judges
could find a justifiable way to budge off the 3-2 split, so the case
had to be set down for reargument, with 2 Justices of the
Appellate Division, selected by the Court of Appeals, vouched in
to participate in that case. That development made a full
complement of 7 Judges, and ultimately flipped the result. At
Conference after reargument, the two vouched-in Judges voted
with the former minority of two permanent Court of Appeal
Judges. That made 4 votes for throwing out the indictment.
Judge Jones who had written the original draft (internal only)
opinion for the three Judges voting to sustain it, immediately
offered and strongly recommended abandoning the majority-
turned-minority position. His rationale: the greater Institutional
interest, called for unanimity in this unusual circumstance,
especially since the very significant precedent would otherwise
ironically be established by and comprise only a minority number
55 51 N.Y.2d 295 (1980).
56 NY CONST. art. VI, § 2(a).
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of the permanent members of the Court. He further explained:
The reliability and stability of the rulings of this Court of last
resort would otherwise be placed at risk or doubt, subject to
renewed challenges. Judge Jones instinctively saw the higher
value and purpose in having the Court speak with a single
definitive voice in this extraordinary circumstance, readily
sacrificing the strongly and personally held belief that he and
two other members of the permanent Court had previously
believed to be the correct outcome. In an exclamation recalled
from my early classical education - Mirabile dictu! - the
unanimous signed opinion for the Court is by no other than the
original reporting-to Conference Judge, Hugh R. Jones, J.57 That
case evolution is a transcendent lesson for all time, of the class of
this great Jurist and his dedication to a principle higher than
himself. The simple toast used at dinner during Albany Sessions
of Court by the Judges of Court, "To the Court," was truly
honored in this one humble illustration.
Returning to my main theme, I acknowledge a part of my own
judicial reputation, for better or worse as they say, that includes
a strong belief in the avoidance of absolutes58 - so did Judge
Jones, so I am in very good company. Because I do not want my
effort in this Lecture to be understood as urging total avoidance
of the Special Prosecutor Paradigm, I need to supply some
semblance of balance, for the rare times that the device may be
unavoidably needed. Indeed, my "caveats" are designed mainly
to raise a cautionary bright orange flag. My effort might thus
serve to alert appointing entities or individuals, and their key
advisors (e.g. any President, Attorneys General US or NYS,
Governors, or the like) to the dangers of using the canon
(homonym pun intended) of a Special Prosecutor. Unfortunately,
I have witnessed an almost knee-jerk invocation as a style too
much evident and at play in our modern political landscape and
culture, though the Federal Independent counsel statute was
57 People v. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d 295 (1980).
58 See, e.g., People v. Dana Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 553 (1987) (Bellacosa, J.
concurring); see also People v. Angela Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d 477, 488 (1994) (Bellacosa, J.
dissenting); People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20, 29 (1989) (Bellacosa, J. dissenting); People v.
Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983); People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006); Abraham
Abramovsky, Depraved Indifference Cases, N.Y. L. J., July 20, 2006, at 3 ("registering"
Bellacosa, J. as a "prophet" for the dissent in Roe, in the wake of Feingold's overruler of
Register, seventeen years too late).
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allowed to lapse. 59 In any event, the use of this Special
Prosecutor Model, keyed to Star Power, Instantaneity and
Specific Expectations, tends to generate more hype and heat than
is appropriate to the deliberative, careful handling of public
accusations of wrongdoing. It is result-oriented and result-
driven, aspects alien and at odds with the pursuit of neutral
justice, wherever that course may lead.
So, in that connection, I offer also a word of caution here about
future mutations - as something to watch for, on a parallel track
or offshoot of some of these notions and concerns about Special
Prosecutors. The jurisprudence is witnessing a modern
phenomenon, a new wave of the exercise of virtually unfettered
powers, in the form of Federal Monitors. They oversee, supervise
and even seem to direct, the actions of corporate Boards of
Directors of public companies. These monitors are appointed or
recommended by U.S. Attorneys, or the U.S. Attorney General,
District Attorneys in some cases, or powerful regulatory agencies.
Some Monitors in their most recent incarnation are accompanied,
actually or in spirit by "their" appointing principal to Boardroom
meetings and deliberations. Confidential reports and documents
are exchanged among these "uber-Board members," creating in
my mind troublesome layers of non-transparency, and even
occasionally personal conflicts of interest. These relatively
newfangled "public officials" of sorts, direct corporate activities,
at least indirectly, with an "Attention must be paid," attitude
that is far more dramatic than Willy Loman's woeful wail in
Arthur Miller's classic Death of a Salesman. What functionally
transpires in this new dynamic is a substitution and superseder
of authority, with unfettered, intimidating, and unilateral
"suggestions" by an outsider, taken as "directives" by all the
insiders. The Monitors to Boards, in effect, replace the
independent exercise of fiduciary responsibilities by the Boards
to their shareholders and the public. These situations, as
publicly reported (the ones we know about), seem to be growing,
and are sometimes based, not on wrongdoing or violations of the
so-called deferred prosecution agreements. They seem instead to
59 The statute expired at midnight June 30, 1999, after a lapse in the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994), which
was set to automatically sunset after five years, absent reauthorization. The necessary
reauthorization did not occur.
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rest on and slip over into ordinary or grey business judgment
calls - or even personal interests of the overseers (e.g., the New
Jersey United States Attorney having a Chair founded and
funded in his name at his Alma Mater as part of a monitored
deferred prosecution agreement with a major U.S. drug
corporation). 60 They can relate to close-call, marginal differing
business judgments or even second guessings. What, I ask
rhetorically, is going on here, and where is this stuff headed? Is
this a trend? Is it licit, justifiable, prudent or smart? I have
considerable doubts and concerns - as you can sense by how I
frame the questions I pose.
A fascinating scenario is described in a recent Wall Street
Journal article 6' dealing with the ouster of a CEO and a
Corporate General Counsel, essentially at the overnight direction
of the retired Federal Judge serving as Monitor, with the
apparent support of the New Jersey U.S. Attorney. The Board of
Directors did as it was told - immediately. Maybe these
leadership personnel changes were the right ultimate decisions.
But is that the right way for them to be made? The precedent is
dubious as to process, and the question for down the road,
however, raises this question: Is this a Son of the Special
Prosecutor? Time will tell. But let no one be unaware, because
this modality, this so-called cure could also turn out to have
unintended side effects, worse than whatever disease generated
the perceived need for this newest and proliferating phenomenon
in the first place. 62
I now return to another prescient, and I think helpful,
observation by Justice Scalia in his Morrison dissent: "Nothing
is so politically effective as the ability to charge that one's
opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, naive,
ineffective, but, in all probability, 'crooks.' And nothing so
effectively gives an appearance of validity to such charges as a
Justice Department investigation and, even better, prosecution.
60 See Richard A. Epstein, Letters to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Dec, 18, 2006, at A17.
61 See John Carreyrou & Joann S. Lublin, At Bristol-Meyers Mr. Robinson Finds More
Woes---Ousted American Express CEO, Now Drug Maker's Chairman, Takes On Crisis
From Other Side, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2006, at B1.
62 See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2006, at A14. This article and a subsequent exchange of Letters to the Editor (12/8/06 and
12/18/06) after my Jones Lecture, resonate strongly to the concerns and cautions I
express.
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The [Ethics in Government] statute's highly visible procedures
assure, moreover, that, unlike most investigations, these will be
widely known and prominently displayed. Thus, in the 10 years
since the institution of the independent counsel was established
by law, there have been nine highly publicized investigations, a
source of constant political damage to two administrations. That
they could not remotely be described as merely the application of
'normal' investigatory and prosecutory standards is demonstrated
by the following facts: Congress appropriates approximately $50
million annually for general legal activities, salaries, and
expenses of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
By comparison, between May, 1986, and August, 1987, four
independent counsel (not all of whom were operating for that
entire period of time) spent almost $5 million (one-tenth of the
amount annually appropriated to the entire Criminal Division),
spending almost $1 million in the month of August, 1987, alone.
For fiscal year 1989, the Department of Justice has requested
$52 million for the entire Criminal Division and $7 million to
support the activities of independent counsel."63
Those raw numbers are stunning and the bottom-line political
and personal impact should be disturbing to any studious
observer of the process. The time and money wasted - relatively
- and reputations ruined or damaged - often permanently - in
many of these investigations and prosecutions present a real,
modern-life spectacle, reminiscent of Charles Dickens' infamous
Bleak House description of justice at Chancery Court: "Jarndyce
and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course
of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows what it
means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been
observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five
minutes without coming to a total disagreement as to all the
premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause;
innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old
people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously
found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce,
without knowing how or why. 64 To see everything going on so
smoothly, and to think of the roughness of the suitors' lives and
63 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 713-14 (Scalia J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
64 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 4 (Bantam Doubleday 1983) (1853).
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deaths; to see all that full dress and ceremony, and to think of
the waste, and want, and beggared misery it represented; to
consider that, while the sickness of hope deferred was raging in
so many hearts, this polite show went calmly on from day to day,
and year to year, in such good order and composure; to behold the
Lord Chancellor, and the whole array of practitioners under
him.., as if nobody had ever heard that all over England the
name in which they were assembled was a bitter jest."65
My theme and concern summon up the spectacles of Dickens in
Bleak House, and even of Franz Kafka in The Trial. Why? Well,
I try to imagine myself or a client or any good citizen caught up
and chewed out in pieces from some seemingly endless special
prosecution or modern mutation, either as a witness or worse, a
target. The process of pursuing justice can become so distorted
and "spectacularized" in these circumstances as to seem a Javert
pursuit of a Jean Valjean melodrama - without the lovely
music. 66 Literary references and actual experience can trigger
the imagination to appreciate somewhat the psychological
trauma involved. In fact, in "American Prometheus, The
Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer," by Kai Bird
and Martin J. Sherwin,67 a chilling description is given of
"veritable kangaroo court" (the authors' phrase). There "the head
judge [of the Atomic Energy Commission] accepted the
prosecutor's lead" to reach a pre-ordained result to destroy Dr.
Oppenheimer's national security clearance and reputation as an
American. That recent Pulitzer Prize biography describes
painstakingly a relatively modern-day horror story of what could
be a parody of the Paradigm, I severely critique in this Lecture.
Ah, but there is the rub for the story is not a parody, but a harsh
reality and real history - in both Oppenheimer's case, and in too
many of the myriad Special Prosecutor scenarios, lately and
throughout recent history.
Notably, in Bleak House, it was the "regularized process" that
had gotten so entangled. A good aspect of our regular systems is
that they seem to enjoy, for the most part, a self-correction
65 Id. at 320.
66 Les Miserables is a musical by Alain Boublil and Claude-Michel Schonberg and is
based on the novel by Victor Hugo.
67 KAI BIRD & MARTIN J. SHERWIN, AMERICAN PROMETHEUS: THE TRIUMPH AND
TRAGEDY OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (Vintage 2006).
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mechanism to prevent the whole legal system from total collapse
or dysfunction. Indeed, Justice Scalia was wrong (happily so, I
am sure) in his further dire prediction in Morrison, that Congress
would never let the Ethics in Government Act lapse. 68 In 1999,
Congress did that very thing and let the Independent Counsel
authorization expire.69 Therefore, the imperfections that inhere
in the human agents who operate our system of governance that
occasionally allow fault lines to crack institutional processes, also
function to resuscitate the primary virtues, by acknowledging
error and correcting it - another marvelous exertion of checks
and balances and another borrowed (moral lesson) of the common
law decision process.
The laboratory of the very bad New York State Special
Prosecutor Nadjari experience did not interpose a stop-in-your-
tracks red flag, nor at least bright orange caution light to the
Feds. Indeed, President Clinton, opened the Ken Starr
Independent Counsel Whitewater channel (pun intended), yet
had this to say about it in a September 18 New Yorker article by
David Remnick p. 42, at 66.70 He told the author that the Special
Prosecutor decision and appointment was "the worst decision of
his Presidency." I suppose this personal re-appraisal was made
not just because of the personal hell it unleashed on him and the
country, but maybe also because of a belated and anguished
historical awareness of the massive distractions from elementary
governance and from other enormously pressing issues of the day
that that Independent Counsel investigation, permutations, and
period caused. When those dam (as in holding back the waters,
another pun) gates were opened, few could have envisioned
(although Justice Scalia warned of it in Morrison) the unintended
tributaries of investigation it cut into the land and across many
lives.
At this point, I wish to interject a cautionary comment about
the media role in these situations. Often media beat the drum
demanding special prosecutor appointments, investing their own
reportorial and editorial interest in the outcomes of recurring
"scandals," and then "collaborating" with the Appointee's Office
68 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat.
732 (1994).
69 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994 expired June 30, 1999.
70 David Remnick, The Wanderer, NEW YORKER, Sept. 18, 2006, at 42, 66.
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in an inimical and conflicted way, for example, by accepting and
publishing unauthorized leaks. 71 They help to give their own
initial stories "journalistic legs." This is yet another of the great
dangers of the Fourth Estate promoting the facile Special
Prosecutor path, with their own scoops and expos6s as a
journalistic agenda. In a sense, this is the media angle and
version of ends justifying means. This self-serving and self-
justifying symbiosis, when it occurs, distorts process and creates
other bad unintended consequences, e.g., dilution, ultimately and
ironically, of First Amendment free press protections because the
abuses tend to breed rebound abuses. 72 The justification for
questionable actions is a breast-beating altruism of the right to
inform the public. Polonius gives us another Shakespearean
admonition about the human condition and rationalizations in
this regard: "By pious actions we do sugar over the devil
himself."73
Just because the lore of history shows that the Government got
Al Capone on IRS charges, when they couldn't prove any of the
substantive mob atrocities he committed, does not warrant
Modern Day Javerts and other Untouchable-types, being pumped
up by the press to go after and get the really "Bad Guys."
Whoever the Jean Valjeans may happen to be at a given
historical moment does not warrant pursuit by questionable or
indirect methods - or by destructive and unfair leaks just to
weaken or destroy the "bad guys" and their reputations - when a
provable crime in a court of law by due process means happens to
be unavailable. That is vigilante justice, not the constitutional
variety that should be this Country's proud hallmark.
While I am on this press/media "beat," so to speak, I think we
71 See Nadjari, supra note 29, at 10.
72 On June 3, 2006, The Washington Post reported that Wen Ho Lee (a U.S. Nuclear
Scientist identified in the news as target of a spy investigation) was to receive $1.6 million
to settle allegations that government leaks violated his privacy - $895,000 from United
States plus $750,000 from news organizations so they would not have to reveal the names
of the government sources. See Paul Farhi U.S., Media Settle with Wen Ho Lee: News
Organizations Pay to Keep Sources Secret, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006 at A01, available at
www.washingtonpost.com. See also Carol D. Leonnig, Judges Order Two Reporters to
Testify on Leak, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2005, at Al, available at www.washingtonpost.com,
which discusses the threats of jail and subpoenas flying with respect to reporters who
refused to reveal their confidential government sources in reference to the Valerie Plame
matter, the subject of a notorious Independent Counsel investigation, indictment and trial
of I. Lewis ("Scooter") Libby.
73 WILLUM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
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might all idealistically agree to deplore the leaks, and maybe
even the tabloid-driven perp walks as unwholesome - even
possibly unethical, some may conclude as I do. Personally, I do
not much like press conferences conducted in advance of and on
indictment announcements because they seem inevitably to have
prejudicial effects. These practices are employed largely to gain
an improper edge, though the public's right to know is always
trotted out as the self-serving justification. They are a modern
day exhibitionism - a latter-day Circus Maximus - pure and
simple. The media plays the often shouting role of whipping up
largely uninformed public fascination as they chase the story and
targets of interest. This produces a fevered or frenzied
atmosphere of Frontier-type justice. Folks are titillated to revel
unthinkingly in tabloidal gossip, in extreme and unfounded
inferences, and in utter speculations. Individuals are hung out to
dry, with a smug assumption that reliable, credible, relevant and
appropriate facts and evidence, if any, can come later - long after
ruination of lives and reputations, - to say nothing of the
pocketbooks being emptied to cover costly defenses against deep-
pocket, virtually unlimited prosecutorial resources. Is this too
dismal and critical a portrayal? I stand ever ready to be
persuaded otherwise and cheered up with a prettier, more
reassuring picture. But, for context, I vividly invoke the movie
"Network" with its signature screaming scene - "I'm Mad as Hell
and I'm Not Going to Take it Anymore!"
As a fantasy counterpoint to this dark picture, for example,
readers should conjure up for a moment, a Special Prosecutor
standing up before a bank of microphones, declaring humbly and
after a responsible look-see: "There's no case here. We are now
closed for business!" That unheard of or rarely seen fantasy
world would, of course, take real courage and strength of
character, contrasted to the hubristic huffing and puffing that
goes on in press settings, characterized by a more typical
"J'Accuse." By the way, the fantasy announcement I propose, if it
were ever to occur, would probably be met by a media-public
"sturm und drang" of unfulfilled expectations, and might be
relegated to three or four lines on the obituary pages; the
accusatory blast, of course, would have been blasted on a "Hear
Ye, Hear Ye, Read All About It" page one headline - followed by
chattering bobbleheads pontificating over at least a 72 hour news
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cable cycle.
To support this personal fulmination, as not entirely
unfounded or unrealistic, notice should be taken of the still quite
vivid and recent clamorings outside the Washington, D.C.
Courthouse, as certain targets of interest (witnesses) were
repeatedly paraded into and out of Grand Jury deliberations in
pursuit of a national security leaker's name - recently revealed
as known all along by the Special Counsel. To be sure, the
mandate in that matter also included an investigation of a
potential high-level obstruction of justice concern.
While the media's own dissatisfaction with some of Special
Counsel Fitzgerald's actions in pursuing and jailing journalists,
and the media may have their own agenda as to him and his
future work including prosecution of Lewis Libby, the recent
revelations cannot have framed the future issue any more pithily
than by the journalistic lead in The New York Times story on
September 2, 2006, "Leak Revelation Leaves Questions."74 The
story lead-in began:
An enduring mystery of the C.I.A. leak case has been
solved in recent days, but with a new twist: Patrick J.
Fitzgerald, the prosecutor, knew the identity of the leaker
from his very first day in the special counsel's chair, but
kept the inquiry open for nearly two more years before
indicting I. Lewis Libby Jr., Vice President Dick Cheney's
former chief of staff, on obstruction charges.
Now, the question of whether Mr. Fitzgerald properly
exercised his prosecutorial discretion in continuing to
pursue possible wrongdoing in the case has become the
subject of rich debate on editorial pages and in legal and
political circles. 75
The public will at some point, I suppose, hear the
rationalization, relevant theory and evidence, if any, for why this
over-the-top scenario has been allowed to be played out over
these now several years before the world and in the federal
courts. My Jonesian cogitation is very skeptical. Here he a
Deputy Attorney General, the Chicago U.S. Attorney, a Brooklyn-
74 David Johnston, Leak Revelation Leaves Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at 1.
75 Id.
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COM4ENTARY
bred New Yorker-type prosecutor, a public official of impeccable
reputation, who was directed to serve additionally as a kind of
separate Special Counsel within the Justice Department for this
"red hot potato" matter. Was he seduced or blinded by the
circumstances and high profile power, or simply justified in his
buttoned-down straight arrow actions? Is this yet another
Special Prosecutor type mutation? Will the unmistakable public
spectacle - to the extent this Deputy Attorney General - Special
Prosecutor fed into it - be rationalized, and the perjury
obstruction indictment of a high Executive Branch public official,
who was (now we know) not the initial source of the so-called CIA
operative leak, be upheld at trial? Was the penumbral crime, (it
could be conspiracy, perjury, official misconduct, or a host and
variety of others constituting "obstruction of justice" that always
orbit a core crime investigation, if there ever was one) - just
another of the available pressure points, power plays and
mechanisms in the powerful prosecutorial playbook? Often these
collateral pursuits are justified and legitimate, to be sure. But
just as often they are abused, as when they become the staple -
the S.O.P., standard operating procedure - designed to reach a
desired or predetermined result by any means. That causes me
again to ask: Is this cure also worse than the suspected disease?
Is there some inherent infirmity in the Paradigm itself? History
may tell, but my answer is discernible from my queries and this
mischievous quip: It has been my experience that those whom
the gods will destroy, they first make foolish at press conferences.
In the instant situation - and other like ones - the repeated
insistence at the indictment press announcement and
extravaganza, - that "process" is a preeminent value and trump
card rings hollow in my ears and judgment in light of the most
recent revelation. 76 The mantra sounds a lot like ends justifying
questionable means, all over again, as it has throughout history.
My personal and professional experiences, and my academic
76 See Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, White House Official I. Lewis Libby
Indicted on Obstruction of Justice, False Statement and Perjury Charges Relating to Leak
of Classified Information Revealing CIA Officer's Identity, Oct. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/
documents/libby-pr_28102005.pdf, quoting Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald, 'The
requirement to tell the truth applies equally to all citizens, including persons who hold
high positions in government." See also Fitzgerald's Wild Source Chase, WALL ST. J., Jan.
8, 2007, at A16.
[Vol. 21:3
IS THE CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
study of the Special Prosecutor Model, thus, lead me to a
discerning and grudging acceptance of the methodology, as an
exceptional mechanism only rarely to be employed and tolerated.
Countervailing checks and balances, right upfront, must always
be explicitly embedded in any exceptional investiture of such
virtually unbridled power.
As a windup, I do not think it is too far a stretch to liken
Special Prosecutors to a Runaway Grand Jury - at least it has
the potentiality to operate in somewhat like fashion. What I
mean by that strong imagery is that they both presume to be
unconstrained by the boundaries of ordinary and prescribed
rules. They are often puffed up or blinded by their own purity of
purpose and an excessively zealous vision of the idealized end
result. Their common thread may be described as a self-
righteous an "I alone know best" attitude. Fortunately,
sometimes later - often too late, however - the ultimate guardian
of fairness and justice, usually the Judicial Branch, may finally
act with neutral oversight to rein in renegade operations.
Belated corrections, however, are like an apology in the back of a
newspaper, weeks after a page one headline story. Tell Dr.
Oppenheimer, for example, in the twilight of his life that his
eventual redemption with a Medal of Honor from his Country
made up for decades of disgrace and excommunication from his
professional society and country. Latter-day efforts, apologies
and recriminations do little more good than Lady Macbeth's
repeated hand-scrubbing in her unsuccessful effort to erase the
spots and stains of her Macbethian-Machiavellian
machinations.77
For a summary exercise, I gather a series of lessons, or
admonitions (some might say, lamentations):
Consider:
0 The inherent dangers of unaccountable power. Tacitus
taught: "The lust for power is ancient and ingrained in
the human soul." 78
Consider:
77 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 1.
78 PUBLIUS CORNELIUS TACITUS, THE ANNALS OF IMPERIAL ROME (Michael Grant
trans., Penguin Books 1956).
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The easy-out tendency to substitute the Special
Prosecutor modality for regularized process and
institutional officers, with defined terms of office and
accountability.
Consider:
* The "atrophication" and diminishment of respect and
real power, actually and perceptually, for regular
processes, by investing a superseding authority with
unbridled power.
Consider:
• Enormous diversions and disproportionate re-allocation
of resources, and loss of the currency of the realm:
integrity - the trust, confidence and respect of the
People, breeding cynicism and frustration.
Consider:
* The expectations of appointing agents and media-driven
populist-desired results, akin to a Salome-like macabre
request to "Bring me the head of John the Baptist on a
platter."
Consider:
* The perverse transmogrification of a "guilty 'till proven
otherwise" syndrome.
Consider:
* Fallible human nature, at its most essential, which
must be balanced and checked especially with respect to
those to whom such enormous, unfettered and irregular
power would be bestowed.
Consider:
* Hubris among the self-righteous - a fatal flaw - paired
in Greek tragedy with the Persona of Nemesis who
always prevailed. This is also appreciated nicely in a
dramatic Shakespearean setting, as when Cassius
speaks to Brutus of Julius Caesar:
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"Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world,
Like a Colossus, and we petty men,
Walk under his huge legs, and peep about
Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed,
that he is grown so great."79
Consider:
* Portia's most apt and relevant warning for the theme of
this Lecture: "Thou shalt have justice, more than thou
desirest" - the reminder to Shylock and all those
demanding a strict "pound of flesh,"80 as so many
Special Prosecutors do.
Consider:
* J. Scalia's caution concerning the Latin proverb: "Fiat
justitia, ruat coelum. Let justice be done, though the
heavens may fall."81 The warning about extreme,
disproportionate, unmeasured and inhumane demands
playing to a mob psyche.
Consider:
* The Untouchables portrayals in characters like Eliot
Ness, Gary Cooper, - et al,: Clean up Dodge City
melodramas that represent over-simplifications of
complex and nuanced problems that instead require
even-handed and level-headed fairness and justice,
applied on a principled basis, to be sure, but with
individualized awareness and circumspection.
Consider:
• Opponents who fear to criticize those given great
powers, and the extreme misuse of people and process,
as illustrated by my student job interview story, infra.
Embedded or implicit here is the innate, human desire
for fame, glory and personal advancement or against
aggrandizement.
79 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2.
80 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
81 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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I conclude with a thank you for the patience and attention to
my effort in this extraordinary venue of the Court of Appeals
Courtroom to celebrate Judge Jones. All may offer a crisp salute
to the individual whose spirit and memory brought this Lecture
to life - The Honorable Hugh R. Jones - a gentleman, scholar
and jurist in the finest traditions of this fabulous Institution. He
brought - and still brings I hope through my constructive
cogitations, modest imitations, lovely reminiscences, and yes
candid criticisms - great credit and honor to this Institution and
its decision-making process, both of which he relished, loved and
served so joyfully, and with such zest and distinction. God Bless
Him in Revered Memory, and God Bless the work of the Court of
Appeals.
